The property tax savings provided by assessment caps are generally lost when homeowners move. There is, therefore, a concern that homeowners get "locked-in" to their current home. Using data from Florida, the results presented in this paper show that the lock-in effect is nontrivial in magnitude, especially for homeowners in single-family homes (in comparison to condominiums) and those located in jurisdictions with relatively low property tax rates.
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of states offer homeowners a property tax relief program that caps how much assessed value can increase in any given year. 1 In an appreciating housing market, declining assessed values relative to market value create property tax savings for homeowners that grow over time. Because these savings are lost if the homeowner moves, caps on increases in assessed values may retard mobility in the housing market. This is potentially a serious issue because artifi cially induced residential immobility can reduce both housing and labor market effi ciency. 2 Nagy (1997), Stohs, Childs, and Stevenson (2001) , Wasi et al. (2005) , Stansel, Jackson, and Finch (2007) , Ferreira (2009), and Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy (forthcoming) have empirically investigated whether a cap on increases in assessed value reduces Keith R. Ihlanfeldt: Department of Economics and DeVoe Moore Center, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, USA (kihlanfe@fsu.edu) mobility (commonly referred to as a "lock-in" effect). 3 Except for Stansel, Jackson, and Finch, all of the studies focus on Proposition 13, which was passed in 1978 in the state of California. This proposition specifi es that a property's assessed value can rise by no more than 2 percent per year as long as it is not sold. Once the property is sold, it is assessed at its market value. Of the California studies, only Nagy's results failed to support the lock-in hypothesis. Stansel, Jackson, and Finch focus on Florida's "Save Our Homes" (SOH) Amendment, which amended the State Constitution in 1992 and became effective in 1995. SOH was patterned after Proposition 13. Like Nagy, Stansel, Jackson, and Finch also failed to fi nd a lock-in effect.
In this paper, additional evidence is provided on whether SOH reduced residential mobility in the state of Florida. Three facts motivate the analysis: (1) the evidence is mixed on whether caps on increases in assessed values generate a lock-in effect, (2) the methodologies used in a number of prior studies likely resulted in omitted variable bias, and (3) Florida has been understudied relative to California.
An attractive methodological approach to investigating whether a cap on increases in assessed value retards mobility is to compare mobility rates where the tax savings are lost upon moving to where the tax savings are portable (i.e., they can be taken with the homeowner when moving from an old to a new home). Florida recently passed legislation that created such a natural experiment. Initially, SOH, like Proposition 13, provided that any tax savings resulting from its property tax cap were lost when the homeowner moved, because for the fi rst year in the new home the homeowner's assessed value was set equal to its market value. In January 2008 Florida passed Amendment One, a constitutional amendment that allows homeowners with homestead exemptions to apply the portable amount (PA) from their old home to their new home. 4 The PA is equal to the difference between the county property appraiser's estimate of the market value of the home (labeled as "just value" in the Florida tax code) and the assessed value. 5, 6 As an example, if PA equals $200,000 and the price of the new home exceeds the price of the old home, the homeowner starts out in the new home with an assessed value $250,000 less ($200,000 PA plus the $50,000 homestead exemption) than the purchase price of the new home. 7 3 Besides a possible lock-in effect from assessment caps, lock-in effects from low interest rate mortgages and falling house prices have been found by Quigley (1987) and Chan (2001) , respectively. More recently Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy (forthcoming) fi nd that both negative equity and rising interest rates lower mobility rates. 4 The other major provision of Amendment One increases the homestead exemption from $25,000 to $50,000.
Homesteaded properties are occupied by their owners who are permanent residents. 5 In Florida, property tax assessors are referred to as appraisers, which sometimes cause them to be confused with loan appraisers. 6 County property appraisers are required by state statute to estimate annually a just value for each property on the tax roll. These estimates are obtained from Computer Assisted Mass Appraisal (CAMA) programs that use information from recent sales to predict what each property would sell for on January 1 of the tax roll year. The Florida Department of Revenue performs an annual audit to evaluate the accuracy of the just value estimates. 7 The maximum portable amount is $500,000. If the homeowner downsizes rather than upsizes, the portable amount is equal to ((
where O and N indicate the old and new home, respectively. In words, the portable amount that can be applied to the new home is the same proportion the portable amount was of just value for the old home.
In this paper, the probability of a home sale is estimated for two large counties in the state of Florida -Duval and Miami-Dade. The model, which is estimated using data from the counties' property tax rolls, applies a difference-in-difference (DID) approach to estimate the strength of the lock-in effect under SOH. The lock-in effect is found to have been nontrivial in magnitude and, holding the PA constant, is found to have been larger in magnitude for homeowners occupying single-family homes (in comparison to condominiums) and for homeowners located in jurisdictions with relatively low property tax rates. Stohs, Childs, and Stevenson (2001) is the only study to take a strictly cross-sectional approach to estimating the effects of property tax caps on lock-in. Home sales rates are compared between California metropolitan areas and metropolitan areas in other states. These rates are found to be lowest in California, which is consistent with the lock-in effect hypothesis. While control variables are included in the sales rate regressions, the possibility of omitted variable bias looms large whenever simple cross-sectional models are estimated. Nagy (1997) and Wasi et al. (2005) compare mobility rates in California before and after Proposition 13 to those for the same time periods for areas outside California. 8 The idea is to see if the California versus non-California mobility rate difference changed subsequent to the passage of Proposition 13. If Proposition 13 has a lock-in effect, the expectation is that after its passage the mobility rate in California would fall (increase less) in comparison to other similar states. Nagy found no evidence of a lock-in effect, while Wasi et al.'s results supported the lock-in hypothesis. While these intertemporal difference comparisons are more reliable than simple cross-sectional comparisons, there is still the possibility that other factors that affected homeowners' mobility may have changed in California around the time Proposition 13 passed. 9 Ferreira (2009) and Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy (forthcoming) estimate probit probability of moving models. In the fi rst paper, Ferreira addresses the lock-in issue by exploiting the passage of two California propositions (#60 passed in 1986 and #90 passed in 1988) . These propositions resemble Florida's Amendment One in that they allow homeowners to move their tax savings from Proposition 13 to a new home as long as the home is in the same county (Proposition 60) or in select counties outside the home county (Proposition 90). Besides their geographical restrictions, these propositions differ from Amendment One in that only homeowners 55 or older qualify for the portability option. Using a regression discontinuity model, Ferreira fi nds that 55-year old homeowners have 25 percent higher moving rates than comparable 54-year olds, which he interprets as strong evidence in support of a lock-in effect. The probit model estimated in the Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy paper includes an estimate of the tax subsidy (which is instrumented to control for measurement error) that the individual homeowner obtains from Proposition 13. A property tax savings of $1,000 is found to reduce mobility by 1 percentage point.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The only study to focus on Florida's SOH amendment, Stansel, Jackson, and Finch (2007) , compares the average tenure in years of full-time homeowners in 20 Florida counties at two points in time -2002 and 2006 . According to Stansel, Jackson, and Finch (2007, p. 124) , "After the implementation of an acquisitional-based property tax system, such as Florida's Save Our Homes, one would expect tenure to increase over time for any given individual due to the accumulation of larger and larger tax savings from the reduction in assessed value below market value." Their evidence, however, contradicted this expected outcome. They suggested that there were other factors that may have obscured the observed relationship between the time since SOH passed and the length of tenure.
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The goal is to estimate the probability that a randomly selected owner-occupied home on the county tax roll will sell in a given time period. The probability of a home selling is equal to the probability of the homeowner putting the house up for sale (P(U)) times the conditional probability that if up for sale a buyer can be found (P(B|U)) : Following Hanushek, and Quigley (1978) , P(U) depends on the utility lost (measured in monetary units) from not being at the optimal level of housing consumption (H*) and moving costs (MC). If the utility loss exceeds moving cost, the homeowner puts his house up for sale; otherwise he does not:
To operationalize (1), we include variables describing the homeowner and his property. These variables are expected to be correlated with disequilibrium in the household's housing consumption and its moving costs and therefore help control for differences in P(U) across housing units. Differences in buyer demand (P(B|U)) are controlled for by including time period and neighborhood fi xed effects.
10 Our principal interest is in how one component of moving costs (i.e., the tax savings provided by SOH) affects the probability of a home being sold before and after the passage of Amendment One.
IV. ESTIMATED MODEL
A linear probability model (LPM) is estimated where the dependent variable equals one if the house sold and zero otherwise. Calculating the DID estimate using the LPM is trivial -it is merely the coeffi cient on an interaction term. Moreover, the LPM yields an unbiased estimate of the DID (DeLeire, 2004) .
The county tax roll data enable us to observe whether each single-family homesteaded property in the county sold in the eleven months before and after the passage of Amendment One on January 29, 2008. Hence, sales are observed beginning on March 1, 2007, and ending on December 31, 2008. 11 Our choice of counties (Duval and Miami-Dade) is based on a number of considerations. First, north and south Florida are very different places that vary in climate, geography, and the demographics and race of its peoples. We sought a representative county from each of these major regions. Duval County is the largest county in north Florida (population = 778,879, according to the 2000 Census) and Miami-Dade is the largest county in south Florida (population = 2,253,362 in 2000) . Second, these two counties have contrasting housing markets. Duval is mostly single-family homes, experienced a relatively small decline in housing prices since Florida's housing bubble burst (-11 percent), and has relatively inexpensive housing (mean home value = $209,000 in 2008). On the other hand, Miami-Dade is split between single-family homes and condominiums, was hit hard by the bubble burst (-27 percent), and remains a relatively high priced market (mean home value = $330,000 in 2008).
12 If our results from testing the lock-in effect from SOH are robust between these two very different counties, this will add credence to our conclusions.
The data cover an atypical time period in the history of Florida's housing market, namely, the period immediately following the peak of the Florida housing boom. There may therefore be a concern that our results have been marred by the burst in Florida's housing bubble. A number of facts serve to allay this concern. First, as outlined below, our econometric model, in essence, compares the sale probabilities of homes in a given month within a small geographic area; hence, our estimates should not be affected by whether the overall market is moving upward or downward. Second, short sales and sales resulting from foreclosures have been pruned from the sample; i.e., only arms-length sales transactions are included. Finally, the two counties we use (especially Duval) have not experienced foreclosure rates as high as some of Florida's other counties. The basic LPM we estimate can be expressed as follows: The data are structured as a repeated cross-section, where there are 22 cross-sections, one for each month. The coeffi cient β 1 is an estimate of the PA effect on the probability of the home selling before Amendment One was passed. The expectation is that a larger PA would reduce the probability of a sale, because a higher PA provides larger tax savings at the current home, which would be lost upon relocation. However, β 1 may also register unobservable factors correlated with PA that may affect mobility. For example, PA will tend to be higher in those neighborhoods that experienced relatively rapid house price appreciation since SOH was passed in 1992. These may be neighborhoods that are particularly attractive to homeowners so that they may be reluctant to leave, thereby reducing the probability of a sale. The estimated coeffi cient on β 1 would then be an upwardly biased estimate of the lock-in effect resulting from SOH. The advantage of the DID estimator is that unobservables that are correlated with PA will not bias our estimates of the SOH lock-in effect as long as the mobility effects of these variables are unaffected by Amendment One.
The coeffi cient on β 2 registers the effect of the interaction between PA and the date of the passage of Amendment One; hence, it is our DID estimate. If SOH caused homeowners to be locked in, the portability provided by Amendment One should result in a positive and statistically signifi cant estimated coeffi cient on β 2 .
Also included in (2) are homeowner and property descriptors (X) and monthly time dummy variables (T). As noted in the previous section, X helps to control for differences across homeowners in their housing consumption disequilibrium and moving costs unrelated to portable amount, and X may also register differences in demand across market segments. The data provide only a single homeowner characteristic -length of tenure in the current home. However, tenure has been found to be a key determinant of homeowner mobility in previous studies (for a review, see Quigley and Weinberg, 1977) .
14 The property descriptors include home age, home value, living area, whether the home is a condominium, and the millage rate of the jurisdiction where the home is located. Finally, the time dummy variables (T) are included in (2) to capture changing market conditions affecting home sales countywide. To further control for the probability of fi nding a buyer (P(B|U)), we also estimated versions of (2) that included neighborhood fi xed effects. One version includes dummy variables for census tracts. Another version includes dummy variables for one-mile square areas that are defi ned by township, range, and section maps. 15 On average, there are roughly four squares in each census tract. By including these fi xed effects we are in effect comparing two homes within the same neighborhood during the same time period. One house sells and the other does not. The question we address is whether the PA attached to the home helps predict which house sells, and whether this effect varies before and after the passage of Amendment One.
The post-amendment period (After A1) is defi ned as the rest of 2008 after the amendment was passed at the end of January. The expectation is that if SOH locked in homeowners with a high PA, this lock-in effect would end when the amendment passed. However, if these homeowners were unaware of the portability provided by Amendment One, then the lock-in effect may have persisted even after the amendment was passed. The evolution of portability in Florida suggests that few homeowners were unaware of the portability provided by Amendment One. A grass roots movement supporting portability began in early 2007, as supporters sought to place it on the Florida ballot through the initiative and referendum process. They had collected about 15,000 signatures to qualify the measure for the ballot when the Florida State Legislature made their efforts irrelevant by voting in June 2007, to place the proposed amendment on the ballot through the legislative referral process. The Governor and Speaker of the House strongly endorsed the amendment. Save Our Homes Portability, Inc. publicized the amendment statewide. The amendment received considerable media attention in the months leading up to the election primarily because it was opposed by teachers and unions, who feared that portability would cause declines in property tax revenues that would weaken their job security.
V. DIFFERENCES IN PORTABLE AMOUNTS AND SIMPLE DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES
Before describing the LPM DID results, some data are presented on how PA varies across different types of homes and neighborhoods, and some simple difference-indifference estimates of the SOH lock-in effect are presented. Tables 1 and 2 report variable means for the entire sample and broken down by portable amount quartiles for Duval County and Miami-Dade County, respectively.
16 Each table is also broken down into two time periods: the 11-month period before Amendment One passed and the 11-month period after it passed. Overall, the tables demonstrate 15 These maps are provided by the Public Land Survey System (PLSS). More information on the PLSS can be found at http://nationalatlas.gov/articles/boundaries/a_plss.html. 16 The means reported in the tables are unweighted.
that there are signifi cant differences in PA across types of homes and neighborhoods. In Duval County the mean PA is about $70,000 both before and after Amendment One, which is about a third of the mean home value. The wide variance in PA is shown by the mean values reported for each of the PA quartiles. The top quartile value is more than seven times greater than the bottom quartile value. In Miami-Dade County the mean PA is much larger than in Duval County, at $153,000 in both the pre-and postamendment periods. This is roughly half of the mean home value. As in the case of Duval County, the PA quartile means show that the mean PA in the top quartile is over seven times larger than the mean in the bottom quartile. In each county, the average PA is less if the home is a condominium and increases with home value, length of tenure, and living area. Shown at the bottom of each table are the relationships between neigh- borhood characteristics and portable value. 17 Portable amounts are higher on average in neighborhoods with higher median incomes and a higher percentage of white residents. In Miami-Dade County only portable amount is also higher in neighborhoods with a higher percentage of Hispanics.
Simple DID estimates are presented in Table 3 . 18 The treatment group is homeowners who have a PA in the top 25 percent of the PA distribution. The control group is homeowners who have a PA in the bottom 25 percent of the PA distribution. Before Amendment One, the treatment group had a lower sale probability than the control group (1) Median income, % White, % Black, and % Hispanic are calculated from census tract data provided by the 2000 Census. 17 The neighborhood characteristics are calculated from census tract data provided by the 2000 Census. 18 These estimates, like the regression estimates to follow, are based on the weighted data.
in both counties, which is consistent with the existence of a lock-in effect from SOH. After Amendment One, the sale probabilities are actually larger for the treatment than for the control groups, although for Duval County the difference is very small. These post-amendment results are consistent with the idea that Amendment One eliminated the lock-in effect from SOH. The DID estimates, which control for permanent differences between groups and time trends, are reported at the bottom of the panel for each county. The estimates, which are positive and therefore consistent with the lock-in effect hypothesis, equal 0.0009 and 0.0008 for Duval and Miami-Dade Counties, respectively. Tables 6 and 7 . The fi rst table for each county reports the estimated coeffi cients (and robust/clustered standard errors) obtained from estimating four versions of (2) . 19 The four versions include the following variables: 1) PA, PA*AfterA1, and T; 2) PA, PA*AfterA1, T, and X; 3) PA, PA*AfterA1, T, X, and census 19 In models without area fi xed effects, robust standard errors are reported. In models with fi xed effects, standard errors allow for error correlation within the areas designated for the fi xed effect (clustered standard errors). Table 3 Simple Diff erence-in-Diff erence Estimates tract fi xed effects; and 4) PA, PA*AfterA1, T, X, and one-mile square area fi xed effects. The second table for each county reports the DID estimate (along with its estimated standard error), the predicted probability of a sale for a home with average values of all variables before and after the passage of Amendment One, and the estimated change in the probability of a sale from a standard deviation increase in portable amount before and after the passage of Amendment One (along with the standard error of the estimate). The results for each county are considered in turn below.
VI. LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE RESULTS

Tables 4 and 5 report the LPM (DID) results for Duval County and the results for Miami-Dade County are in
A. Duval County Results
The LPM results for Duval County are reported in Table 4 . Regardless of the version of (2) estimated, the estimated coeffi cient on PA is negative and highly signifi cant. (The estimates tend to be somewhat larger in absolute magnitude when including the area (1) (2) (3)
Portable amount (PA) -7.33e-09** -8.12e-09** -9.69e-09** -9.44e-09** (8.09e -10) Asterisks denote signifi cance at the 1% (**) and 5% (*) levels.
(1) All models include dummy variables for month. Model (3) includes fi xed effects for census tracts. Model (4) includes fi xed effects for one-mile square areas.
(2) Robust standard errors are reported for Models (1) and (2). Clustered standard errors at the level of the fi xed effects are reported for Models (3) and (4).
Table 4
Probability of a Home Selling: Linear Probability Model Results for Duval County 1 fi xed effects.) Hence, prior to the passage of Amendment One, a larger PA was associated with a lower sale probability. The estimated coeffi cient on the interaction between PA and the passage of Amendment One (the DID estimate) is positive and statistically signifi cant across all four estimated models. These results indicate that the negative effect of PA on sale probability declined after the passage of Amendment One, which is consistent with there being a lock-in effect from SOH.
In the second table for Duval County (Table 5) column (1) repeats the DID estimates from Table 4 for summary purposes. Columns (2) and (3) show that the sale probability predicted for a home with mean values for all variables increased after the passage of Amendment One and that the increase was nontrivial in magnitude. 20 The most revealing comparison, however, comes from Columns (4) and (5). Before Amendment One a one standard deviation increase in PA ($70,159) resulted in a statistically signifi cant decline in sale probability. After Amendment One, a one standard deviation increase in PA has no statistically signifi cant effect on the sale probability in three of the four estimated models. (In the other model signifi cance is attained only at the lower designated level.) 20 Predicted probabilities at the point of means are reported only for those models without fi xed effects. Once fi xed effects are included, the predicted probability will vary across spatial units, with each unit having a before and after Amendment One predicted probability. Before versus after comparisons, therefore, become too unruly for summary purposes. 
T 6.61e-09** 6.17e-05 5.26e-04 -5.14e-04** -5.10e-05 (9.82e-10) 2 (5.63e-05) (3.90e-05) T, X 7.06e-09** 1.24e-04 6.50e-04 -5.69e-04** -7.39e-05 (1.00e-09) (8.14e-05) (6.80e-05)
T, X, Tracts 7.07e-09** -6.80e-04** -1.84e-04* (1.08e-09) (8.13e-05) (8.26e-05)
T, X, Squares 7.10e-09** -6.62e-04** -1.64e-04 (1.07e-09) (9.01e-05) (8.50e-05)
Asterisks denote signifi cance at the 1% (**) and 5% (*) levels.
(1) T = month dummy variables; X = home age, home value, living area, condo, duration of stay in months; Tracts = census tract fi xed effects; Squares = one-mile square area fi xed effects.
(2) Robust standard errors are reported for models without fi xed effects. Clustered standard errors at the level of the fi xed effects are reported for models with fi xed effects.
Table 5
Duval County Results: Before and After Amendment One
The loss in signifi cance in the effect from a one standard deviation increase in PA after Amendment One was passed suggests that the lion's share of the effect estimated before the passage of Amendment One can be attributed to a lock-in effect. Given that the average millage rate in Duval County is 17, an increase in portable amount of $70,159 results in a tax savings of about $1,200. The Before A1 estimates reported in Table 5 (Column (4)) are similar in magnitude across estimated models and approximately equal -0.0007 in the models containing neighborhood fi xed effects. On average, a home has a 0.01 probability of selling in any given month. 21 Hence, a one standard 21 This is calculated for 2006 to avoid the effect that the bubble burst may have had on turnover.
Table 6
Probability of a Home Selling: Linear Probability Model Results for Miami-Dade County
Portable amount (PA) -4.14e-09** -3.92e-09** -5.48e-09** -4.93e-09** (2.25e-10) 2 (2.81e-10) (5.31e-10) (4.62e-10) PA * AfterA1 4.95e-09** 4.96e-09** 4.95e-09** 4.94e-09** (2.61e-10) (2.60e-10) (6.98e-10) (5.55e-10) Asterisks denote signifi cance at the 1% (**) and 5% (*) levels.
deviation increase in PA providing $1,200 in tax savings would reduce this probability to 0.0093, which is a 7 percent decline in probability value. Given that Duval County has about 102,400 homesteaded properties, the reduction in monthly turnover from a one standard deviation increase in PA would result in about 860 fewer home sales per year. The results therefore suggest that not only was there a lock-in effect from SOH, but it was nontrivial in magnitude.
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B. Miami-Dade County Results
The results for Miami-Dade County are reported in Tables 6 and 7 . Similar to the fi ndings for Duval County, Table 6 shows that regardless of the version of (2) An asterisk (*) denotes signifi cance at the 1% level. No asterisk denotes signifi cance at less than the 5% level.
(2) Robust standard errors are reported for models without fixed effects. Clustered standard errors at the level of the fi xed effects are reported for models with fi xed effects.
estimated: (1) the estimated coeffi cient on PA is negative and highly signifi cant, and (2) the estimated coeffi cient on the interaction between PA and the passage of Amendment One is positive and highly signifi cant. The results reported in Table 7 for Miami-Dade are also highly similar to the second table (Table 5 ) of results for Duval:
(1) the probability of a home selling with mean values is higher after the passage of Amendment One, (2) the change in sale probability before Amendment One from a one standard deviation increase in PA ($123,000) is negative and signifi cant in all cases, and (3) the change in sale probability after Amendment One from a standard deviation increase in PA is small in all four models and is statistically insignifi cant in the models containing neighborhood fi xed effects. Given that the average millage rate in Miami-Dade County is 16, an increase in PA of $123,000 results in an annual tax savings of about $2,000. The decrease in sale probability from the $123,000 increase in PA ranges between 0.0006 to 0.0007 in the models including neighborhood fi xed effects. As in Duval County, the average owner-occupied home has a probability of being sold roughly equal to 0.01 in any given month. 23 Hence, the $2,000 tax savings from the one standard deviation increase in PA results in a 6 to 7 percent decline in the probability value of a sale, which corresponds quite closely to the results for Duval County. 24 The results are therefore highly robust between the two counties and point to the existence of an important lock-in effect resulting from the SOH assessment cap.
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VII. VARIATIONS IN THE SOH LOCK-IN EFFECT
The SOH lock-in effect may not be the same for all types of homeowners. In particular, the effect may vary between owners of single-family homes and condominiums. Because of their smaller size, moving costs are generally lower for homeowners living in condominiums in comparison to single-family homes. Therefore, at any given time condominium owners on average are expected to be closer to their optimal level of housing consumption; hence, a given increase in the tax savings provided by SOH is less likely to retard a condominium owner's mobility in comparison to the mobility of someone owning a single-family home. . 25 The control variables also perform similarly between the two counties. In the models without the area fi xed effects, in both counties sale probability increases with home value and decreases with living area and duration of stay. 26 To illustrate with a simple numerical example, assume that the monetary value of the utility loss from not being in consumption equilibrium is $100 and $1,000 for condo and single-family owners, respectively. Then an increase in tax savings from $500 to $2,000 has no effect on condo owners' mobility, but causes the single-family owners to switch from moving to not moving.
The lock-in effect may also vary between homeowners in low versus high property tax jurisdictions. Before Amendment One, homeowners living in high tax jurisdictions were able to offset some of their lost property tax savings by moving to a lower tax jurisdiction. This becomes more diffi cult the lower the homeowner's current tax rate. Hence, it is expected that the lock-in effect is larger for homeowners living in low tax areas. To investigate the above hypotheses, (2) was reestimated with the appropriate additional interaction variables included in order to allow the lock-in effect to vary. A full set of results are reported in Table 8 for each of the counties. Table 9 provides the estimated effect of a one standard deviation increase in PA on the sale probability of single-family homes, condominiums, homes located in low tax jurisdictions, and homes located in high tax jurisdictions. Our focus is on the Before A1 estimates.
In Duval County there is no difference in the estimated lock-in effect between condominiums and single-family homes. However, in Miami-Dade County the effect is signifi cantly larger (both statistically and quantitatively) for single-family homes.
27 A one standard deviation increase in PA reduces the probability of a single-family home sale by 0.00132, but the probability of a condominium sale declines by only 0.0007. So, the $2,000 worth of tax savings provided by the PA change would reduce the sale probability of single-family homes and condominiums by 13 percent and 7 percent, respectively.
The lock-in effects estimated separately for low and high tax areas show that in both counties the effect is greater for homeowners located in low tax areas and the differ- Single-family -1.06e-02* -1.67e-03 -1.32e-03** 7.28e-05 (5.26e-03) 2 ence between areas is statistically signifi cant. In a low tax jurisdiction (millage rate set at 25 th percentile), a one standard deviation increase in PA reduces sale probability by 0.0007 in both counties. In a high tax jurisdiction (millage rate set at 75 th percentile), the reduction in sale probability in Duval is 0.0006 and in Miami-Dade is 0.0005. The results in Table 9 , therefore, provide evidence that supports both of our hypotheses regarding how the SOH lock-in effect differs across types of homes/homeowners.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined whether caps on annual increases in assessed values reduce homeowner mobility. The results, which are robust across counties and alternative model specifi cations, strongly suggest that Florida's SOH assessment cap (maximum 3 percent increase per year) did have a lock-in effect of nontrivial magnitude. Although we could only identify seven states that have SOH-like assessment caps, many of them are found to have large populations (e.g., California, Texas, and Michigan). Hence, our results suggest that the lock-in effect may be affecting the mobility of millions of homeowners in the United States, with the potential to be causing signifi cant misallocation of resources. Lock-in effects should be considered by states and local governments before they adopt assessment caps. Where caps already exist, governments may wish to consider whether the cap should be continued in light of its lock-in effect. Where caps are permanent, states might want to consider what Florida has done and allow homeowners to move their tax savings between homes. However, there are important questions regarding portability that need to be answered in future research before it can be recommended as a policy option. First, in Florida there is the concern that many homeowners with substantial portable amounts may tend to concentrate in selected jurisdictions, resulting in these jurisdictions losing signifi cant tax base. Is this a valid concern both generally and specifi cally for Florida? Second, portability lowers the tax price of public services of those homeowners who have portable amounts. Are homeowners going to look to move into those places offering more or better public services? Third, what will portability do to inter-state mobility? Since portable amounts can only move within the state of Florida, will this keep, for example, workers from moving to higher wage, lower unemployment areas outside Florida? Finally, how will portability affect the property tax as judged against the horizontal equity and benefi ts principles of just taxation? Prior to portability, SOH provided homeowners with longer tenures in their current homes greater property tax savings. However, the horizontal inequity between two homeowners, one with short tenure and another with long tenure, would be eliminated when the latter homeowner moved. With portability, inequities persist even after homeowners with different lengths of tenure change their residences. The question for future research is not whether portability worsens the horizontal inequity of the property tax, but rather by how much. Portability also further breaks the link between taxes paid and services received, making it harder to justify the property tax on the benefi ts principle. Again, the issue is the magnitude of the gap created by portability between taxes and services.
